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CONTROLLING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
COLORADO AS A CASE STUDY
GABRIEL J. CHINt
ABSTRACT
Criminal justice reformers have recognized that many in the criminal
justice system have the power to incur expenses that will be paid by some-
one else; a city police officer can make an arrest, for example, that will
result in jail expenses paid for by the county, a county prosecutor can
charge a crime which will result in a prison sentence paid for by the state.
There is another, largely unexamined means by which actors in the crimi-
nal justice system can externalize cost: states have donated law enforce-
ment authority to the federal government, and vice versa. Using the exam-
ple of Colorado, this Article maps out the ways in which Colorado shares
arrest and prosecutorial power. The United States, in turn, makes it possi-
ble for Colorado law enforcement officers to make arrests for federal
crimes, and Colorado prosecutors to prosecute them. Because charging au-
thority (and therefore spending authority) has been diffused, it will be
more difficult for decision makers in one jurisdiction to establish binding
criminal justice policy, even in its own courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemplation of justice reinvestment requires appreciation of the
diffusion of authority in the system. A growing body of scholarship rec-
ognizes the consequences of the lack of centralization of authority in the
system, and the lack of financial accountability.' A police officer making
t Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair & Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School
of Law.
1. W. David Ball and others have authored recent important works. See W. David Ball, De-
funding State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060,1063-64 (2014); W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on
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an arrest, a prosecutor charging a case, and a judge imposing a sentence
spends tax dollars which are often or usually paid for by a wholly separate
2government agency or branch. Put another way, the system gives no sug-
gestion to police, prosecutors, and judges that their decisions should be
made with awareness of the costs. If the responsible leaders of govern-
ments paying these costs had a choice, they might often conclude, for ex-
ample, that a ten-year sentence plus hiring a police officer would be a bet-
ter use of resources than a forty-year sentence, or that mental health or
drug addiction treatment for a particular offender was more likely to pro-
mote public safety than a prison sentence. But in many instances, the pros-
ecutor's options are criminal charges or nothing, a judge's options are
prison or nothing, resulting in counter-productive or suboptimal results at
great expense.
This Article addresses ome of the structural difficulties jurisdictions
will face in trying to rein in their criminal justice systems. The central ob-
servation is this: just as there can be no fire without an ignition source,
oxygen, and combustible material, there can be no criminal conviction
without someone willing and able to investigate crime and present it to a
prosecutor, someone willing and authorized to prosecute it, and a court.
Our system widely diffuses authority to investigate arrest and charge-
there are many peace officers and many prosecutors who have broad dis-
cretion about the cases they should pursue.3 The system does not widely
disseminate judicial authority; a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent
or Colorado State Patrol officer with a drug felony can pursue the case
only in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado or the state
District Court for the appropriate county.4 Yet, state and federal criminal
courts have perhaps the least discretion of any actor in the system about
charging; unlike police and prosecutors, they have almost no authority to
reject cases properly brought before them.s Accordingly, each of the many
law enforcement and prosecutorial entities in the criminal justice system
the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration Rates-
And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2012); see also, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Con-
solidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
677, 678-79 (2016) ("Put briefly, prosecutors do not have to internalize the costs of their sentencing
decisions because they do not have to run and pay for the prisons and jails. That responsibility falls to
the wardens who run the prisons and the sheriffs who run the jails."); Michael Polakowski & Michael
Gottfredson, The Use of Prisons as a Commons Problem: An Exploratory Study, 33 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 70, 74 (1996) (examining common pool use of prison space and promoting the allocation of
prison space based on a jurisdiction's crime rate). Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins coined the
phrase the "correctional free lunch." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF
IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991). The economics literature also addresses the issues. See, e.g., Kenneth L.
Avvio, The Economics ofPrisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 143 (1998).
2. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 678-79.
3. Id. at 677.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed. . . ."); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16.
5. See notes 53-54, infra, and accompanying text.
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can attempt to implement its own criminal justice policy, seeking to per-
suade like-minded others to help carry it out. Because the criminal justice
system now widely disseminates investigating and charging power, to
make it possible to impose a unified criminal justice strategy will require
significant structural changes.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF STATE OFFICERS
One structural challenge in controlling the criminal justice system
legislatively comes from Supreme Court cases. Supreme Court cases
sometimes say that particular criminal justice actions are permitted only
when founded on a statute meeting particular constitutional criteria, for
6
example, the wiretap case of Berger v. New York. More often though, the
Court declares that certain conduct by state officers is lawful even without
an authorizing statute.7 That is, the Court reads the Constitution, essen-
tially, as granting a set of specific powers to police which are reasonable
even if unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction empowering and paying
the police. Thus, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court upheld the practice
of stop and frisk9 apparently without considering whether the Ohio legis-
lature believed it to be legitimate or desirable.'0
It is not merely that the Court grants police the power to commit acts
not authorized by state law. In Virginia v. Moore," the Court held the
Fourth Amendment deemed reasonable even actions prohibited by state
law.12 Specifically, "warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the pres-
ence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that
while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state
restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections.',13
6. 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) ("[W]e have concluded that he statute is deficient on its face . . .
7. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); id. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9. The Court's holding was as follows:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of inves-
tigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced
in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
Id. at 30-31 (majority opinion).
10. Id. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
I1. 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
12. Id. at 178.
13. Id at 176. The Court reasoned that the protection of the Fourth Amendment should not vary
jurisdiction by jurisdiction, an odd and, in my view, unpersuasive reason standing alone in that officers
generally work in one jurisdiction, and the criminal law of each jurisdiction varies from state to state
and between the states and the United States. Accordingly, a well-trained officer is going to have to
know the specifics of that jurisdiction's criminal offenses and procedures.
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Of course, state legislatures and courts can pass their own laws and
rules regulating the criminal justice system and its actors.14 But here, too,
federal law imposes limits. To a significant degree, states and localities
can be subjected to federal statutory requirements." And while the princi-
ple of Printz v. United Statesl6 provides that states and their employees
cannot be "commandeered" to carry out federal legislation,17 there is some
authority that Congress can permit state employees to engage in conduct.is
A provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INS) invites govern-
ment officials-not necessarily limited to law enforcement officers-to
exchange immigration information with the INS:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit,
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending
to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service in-
formation regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.19
Many localities have policies restricting or prohibiting their officers
from investigating immigration matters;20 one of them, the City of New
York, sued to have the policy declared unconstitutional.2' The Second Cir-
cuit held that the United States had the power to insist that state and local
employees disobey the instructions of their employers: "states do not re-
tain under the Tenth Amendment an untrammeled right to forbid all vol-
untary cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal pro-
grams."22 Federal displacement of state authority over its employees in a
regime when the federal government cannot direct and control state em-
ployees directly creates employees who, on this issue, can act unilaterally
and be answerable to no one.23 Another example of federal displacement
of state authority is the Law Enforcement Officer's Safety Act, allowing
14. See id.; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (recognizing "supervisory au-
thority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts"); People v. Renander, 151 P.3d
657, 660 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting court's "supervisory authority to protect the integrity of the judi-
cial process").
15. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
16. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
17. Id. at 928, 935.
18. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
19. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1644 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending
to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigra-
tion status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.").
20. See Ingrid v. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV.
245, 256-57 (2016).
21. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999).
22. Id. at 35. But see Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (up-
holding LAPD rule restricting immigration investigations).
23. The home rule provisions of Colorado's constitution also may impose some limits on state
regulation of peace officers. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge No. 27 v. City & Cty. of
Denver, 926 P.2d 582, 584-585 (Colo. 1996).
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specified state and local police to carry firearms nationally, without regard
to state law, or their own department's policies.24
II. BROAD DIFFUSION OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
Colorado law makes many categories of persons peace officers, with
powers to arrest,25 apply for, and execute warrants26 or orders to produce
records,27 and sign a summons and complaint.28 Not surprisingly, "peace
officers" include police officers of a municipal police department,29 sher-
iffs and deputy sheriffs,30 town marshals and deputy marshals,31 reserve
32
police deputy sheriffs, deputy marshals, Officers of the Colorado State
Patrol,33 and agents of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation.34 But the fifty
or so categories listed in the Colorado Revised Statutes also include, for
example, the Commissioner of Agriculture35 and members of the Public
Utilities Commission.36
District attorneys are the principal prosecutors in the state,37 and they
may get investigative support and case referrals from the police and sher-
iffs in their counties. However, they do not need to rely on other agencies.
They may employ investigators who are peace officers.3 8 Indeed, district
attorneys, including deputy, assistant, and special assistant district attor-
neys, are themselves peace officers.39 Similarly, while the attorney general
has more constrained criminal jurisdiction, attorney general investigators
are peace officers,4 0 as are the Attorney General and deputies and assis-
tants involved in criminal enforcement or who are so designated.4 1
24. 18 U.S.C. § 926B(a) (2012).
25. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102 (2016).
26. Id. § 16-3-305(5).
27. Id. § 16-3-301.1(5)(a).
28. Id. § 16-2-104.
29. Id. § 16-2.5-105.
30. Id. § 16-2.5-103(1).
31. Id. § 16-2.5-108.
32. Id. § 16-2.5-110(l)(b).
33. Id. § 16-2.5-114.
34. Id.§ 16-2.5-113.
35. Id § 16-2.5-118.
36. Id § 16-2.5-143.
37. People ex rel. Losavio v. Gentry, 606 P.2d 57, 62 (Colo. 1980).
38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-133 ("A district attorney chief investigator and a district attor-
ney investigator are peace officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the
state of Colorado and who may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
39. Id. § 16-2.5-132 ("A district attorney, an assistant district attorney, a chief deputy district
attorney, a deputy district attorney, a special deputy district attorney, and a special prosecutor are peace
officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the state of Colorado and who
may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
40. Id § 16-2.5-129 ("An attorney general criminal investigator is a peace officer whose au-
thority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the state of Colorado and who shall be certified by
the P.O.S.T. board.").
41. Id. § 16-2.5-128 ("The attorney general, chief deputy attorney general, solicitor general,
assistant solicitors general, deputy attorneys general, assistant attorneys general of criminal enforce-
ment, and certain other assistant attorneys general and employees of the department of law who are
501
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There has been litigation about the authority of peace officers who
are off duty and with regard to those working in a limited geographical
jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that peace officers may
42
make arrests off duty. However, conviction of a suspect for resisting ar-
rest based on an off-duty arrest may require evidence that the arrest was
authorized by the employing agency.43
The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that peace officers may
investigate throughout the state if they are working on crimes that may
have taken place in their jurisdiction.4 However, in People v. Wolf,45 the
Court held that officers could generally only make arrests within their ju-
risdiction, yet declined to impose an exclusionary sanction because the ar-
rest was made based on probable cause.46 Justice Quinn dissented, insist-
ing that a geographical restriction "help[s] to preserve the political auton-
omy of municipal and county subdivisions of government by limiting the
extraterritorial authority of municipal police officers to the carefully de-
fined exigencies therein described."47 The Court later stated "that in many
situations citizens of a particular community may best be served by the
requirement that local officers familiar with local neighborhoods accom-
pany peace officers from other jurisdictions seeking to arrest a defendant
allegedly present in the community."48 The legislature at least partially
disagreed, subsequently enacting a statute allowing peace officers to make
arrests for crimes taking place in their presence anywhere in the state.49
designated by the attorney general are peace officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of
all laws of the state of Colorado and who may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
42. People v. Rael, 597 P.2d 584, 586 (Colo. 1979) (permitting off-duty arrests by holding
"[a]uthority for performance of the duty, service or function is not limited by the person's status as an
On-duty peace officer").
43. People in Interest of J.J.C., 854 P.2d 801, 802 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-3-109 (allowing off-duty arrests).
44. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 200 (Colo. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by People v.
Begay, 325 P.3d 1026 (Colo. 2014). Similarly, the attorney general may investigate in situations where
prosecution is limited to a district attorney. People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20, 23 n.10 (Colo. 1984) ("We
agree with the Attomey General that statutory investigative powers can exist independent of prosecu-
torial powers.").
45. 635 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
46. Id. at 217 ("Since the arrest in this case did not offend against constitutional restraints on
unreasonable seizures, we decline to impose the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the statutory viola-
tion. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). None-
theless, we do not approve of the actions of the Denver police which were in violation of the statutes
governing their authority to arrest. Law enforcement officers hould not make excursions into another
jurisdiction to ferret out crime without first securing approval of the law enforcement authorities in
that jurisdiction, or to make an arrest when they are not in fresh pursuit.").
47. Wolf 635 P.2d at 218 (Quinn, J., dissenting).
48. People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1983).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-110(2) (2016) ("A peace officer shall have the authority to act in
any situation in which a felony or misdemeanor has been or is being committed in such officer's pres-
ence, and such authority shall exist regardless of whether such officer is in the jurisdiction of the law
enforcement agency that employs such officer or in some other jurisdiction within the state of Colo-
rado or whether such officer was acting within the scope of such officer's duties when he or she ob-
served the commission of the crime, when such officer has been authorized by such agency to so act.").
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Discretion is a key aspect of peace officer authority. Law enforce-
ment officers are given power to make arrests or file charges, but they are
not generally required to do so.50 Similarly, in cases recognizing both the
right to pursue or not pursue particular charges,5 ' the Court has recognized
"the prosecutorial discretion vested in the district attorney by separation
of powers principles."52 However, courts enjoy no such discretion.53 Col-
orado law provides that a sentencing judge "shall" impose a sentence as
provided by law following a conviction.54
III. SHARED STATE AND FEDERAL POWERS
A. Colorado Donation ofPowers to the United States
Several provisions of Colorado law grant law enforcement powers to
federal law enforcement officers. Of course, federal agents can act under
federal authority in the course of their jobs with no requirement of state
permission. Nevertheless, the state has invited federal agents to enforce
56
Colorado law in several provisions.
First, Colorado law provides that specified federal law enforcement
officers are Colorado peace officers, including agents and officers of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms, and Explosives (BATFE); U.S. Marshals Service; Federal Protective
50. Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion: A Comparative Perspective, 64 IND. L.J.
873, 894 (1989) ("Operational statutes with mandatory enforcement language are presently in decline
and are being replaced by provisions much like those found in [COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102
(1986)] . . . ."); see also People v. Triantos, 55 P.3d 131, 135 (Colo, 2002) ("[T]he statute grants
arresting officers discretion to release or not, but nothing indicates the arrest cannot be a full custodial
arrest, and the release after a search incident thereto.").
51. People v. Dist. Court, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. 1974) ("The statute relating to deferred pros-
ecution, above cited, provides that prosecution is deferred upon order of the court 'with the consent of
the defendant and the prosecution.' The prosecutor's consent is a matter of prosecutorial discretion
just as is the choice of several possible charges to press or the decision to move for the dismissal of a
criminal charge." (citations omitted)).
52. People v. Storlie, 327 P.3d 243, 246 (Colo. 2014); see also People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180,
1189 (Colo. 2006) ("Prosecutorial discretion to bring or not bring charges is extraordinarily wide.").
53. Annotation, Power ofCourt to Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss Prosecution, 69 A.L.R. 240
(1930) ("[T]he court has no power, in the absence of statute, to dismiss a prosecution or to enter a
nolle prosequi to a good indictment, over the protest or objection of the prosecuting attorney." (citing
People v. Zobel, 130 P. 837, 838 (Colo. 1913) (further citations omitted))).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(6) ("In imposing a sentence to incarceration, the court shall
impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges . . . unless it concludes that extraor-
dinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the
sentencing hearing and the presentence report, and support a different sentence which better serves the
purposes of this code with respect to sentencing, as set forth in Section 18-1-102.5. If the court finds
such extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, it may impose a sentence which is lesser
or greater than the presumptive range; except that in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than
twice the maximum nor less than one-half the minimum term authorized in the presumptive range for
the punishment of the offense."); see also, e.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) (ex-
plaining that "the right to relieve from the punishment fixed by law and ascertained according to the
methods by it provided, belongs to the executive department" not courts).
55. Forrest v. Jack, 294 U.S. 158, 162 (1935) (stating that a federal regulator "acts under federal
authority and . . . may not be trammeled, controlled, or prevented by state laws").
56. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-2.5-147(1), 16-2.5-151,16-3-110.
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Service; Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agents;57 and Secret Service.5 In addition, apparently even if not a peace
officer under the above sections, "[a] federal law enforcement officer who,
pursuant to federal statutes and the policy of the agency by which the of-
ficer is employed, is authorized to use deadly physical force in the perfor-
mance of his or her duties" can use force and make arrests based on a crime
committed in the officer's presence.59 The Tenth Circuit upheld a convic-
tion under the Assimilative Crimes Act for violating a Colorado statute
prohibiting hindering a peace officer.60 The Court explained that "what-
ever his status under federal law, Commander Lundy, along with his fel-
low Federal Protective Service officers, is clearly and expressly treated as
a 'peace officer' for purposes of Colorado law." 61
Colorado law also provides for broad appointment of special deputy
district attorneys.62 The function of this appointment is to allow other state
and federal prosecutors to prosecute Colorado crimes on their own, with-
out requiring the time of the regular district attorney's staff. These specials
are unpaid, and
[s]uch special deputies shall only be appointed from among those per-
sons holding office as attorney general, deputy attorney general, assis-
tant attorney general, or special assistant attorney general of the state
of Colorado, or as district attorney, assistant district attorney, chief
deputy district attorney, or deputy district attorney of another judicial
district, or as United States attorney or assistant United States attorney
for the district of Colorado, or as city attorney or assistant city attorney
of a city and county in this state, or an attorney employed by the Col-
orado district attorneys' council and actively licensed to practice law
in the state of Colorado.63
57. Id. § 16-2.5-147(1) ("A special agent of the federal bureau of investigation or the United
States bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives, a deputy or special deputy United States
marshal, or an officer of the federal protective service of the United States department of homeland
security immigration and customs enforcement, in any jurisdiction within the state of Colorado, is a
peace officer whose authority is limited as provided in this section. The special agent, deputy or special
deputy, or officer is authorized to act in the following circumstances: (a) The special agent, deputy or
special deputy, or officer is: (I) Responding to a nonfederal felony or misdemeanor that has been
committed in the presence of the special agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer; (II) Responding
to an emergency situation in which the special agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer has probable
cause to believe that a nonfederal felony or misdemeanor involving injury or threat of injury to a
person or property has been, or is being, committed and immediate action is required to prevent escape,
serious bodily injury, or destruction of property; (III) Rendering assistance at the request of a Colorado
peace officer; or (IV) Effecting an arrest or providing assistance as part of a bona fide task force or
joint investigation with Colorado peace officers; and (b) The agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer
acts in accordance with the rules and regulations of his or her employing agency.").
58. Id. § 16-2.5-151.
59. Id. § 16-3-110.
60. United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027, 1035 (10th Cir. 2014).
61. Id.
62. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-201(1)(c).
63. Id. This statute legislatively overruled People ex rel. Brown v. District Court, 585 P.2d 593
(Colo. 1978), which held that an assistant attorney general could not also be appointed as a special
assistant district attorney.
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Special deputy district attorneys serve at the pleasure of the district
attorney and, therefore, presumably could be closely supervised if such is
the desire of the agency. On the other hand, the door could also be opened
to an essentially wholesale delegation of authority to other lawyers, in-
64
cluding Assistant U.S. Attorneys. One could imagine that if a district at-
torney delegated authority to a member of another respected prosecutorial
institution, close monitoring of the cases pursued would not be a high pri-
ority. After all, the prosecutions would come at no expense to the district
attorney, and in the absence of disproportionately poor results or negative
publicity, there might seem little point.
Presumably, no Colorado law enforcement official has the authority
to supervise, instruct, or discipline the peace officers who are federal em-
ployees.65 They may act, as may all Colorado peace officers, in their dis-
-66
cretion.
B. Federal Donation ofAuthority to Colorado
Federal law also grants substantial state authority to state and local
officials. In terms of arrest authority, it was once thought that the right of
state officers to make an arrest for a federal crime turned on state law.67
More recently the Court has held that even for arrests for state crimes, state
law does not determine the validity of an arrest.68 The Tenth Circuit has
recognized the general rule that "[t]he federal constitution allows a state
law enforcement officer to make an arrest for any crime, including federal
immigration offenses."69 This is true if Colorado law fails to authorize or
even prohibits such arrests for federal crimes.7 0 In addition, state officers
64. COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-201(1)(c).
65. Cf Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 54 (1890).
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-101(1).
67. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589-90 (1948) ("[I]n [the] absence of an applicable
federal statute the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its valid-
ity."); Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 173 (2d Cir. 1928) ("Assuming, however, that the trooper
stopped the car for the violation of a local ordinance, and either saw the liquors or was told of them
by the defendant, we have yet to determine whether his seizure of them was lawful. This, as we view
it, is a question only of state law, unless we have recourse to some common law of federal criminal
procedure, if any there be. We think that the state law authorized what he did, and find it unnecessary
to consider the alternative." (citations omitted)); I ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES § 4:6, Westlaw (database updated June 2016) (cataloging older authorities looking to
state law).
68. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) ("We conclude that warrantless arrests for
crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and
that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the
Fourth Amendment's protections.").
69. United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App'x 485, 488 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v.
Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999); cf George Bach, State Law to the Contrary?
Examining Potential Limits on the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement to Enforce Federal
Immigration Law, 22 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 67, 67 (2012).
70. United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1346 (10th Cir. 2009) ("In light of Moore, whether
APD had authority under Colorado law to arrest Mr. Turner is irrelevant. Moore makes clear that if
officers have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed in their presence, they may
arrest and search incident to that arrest without violating the Fourth Amendment, even if such police
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may actually be given the status of federal law enforcement officers, rather
than acting in their state capacities.7 Thus, they gain any specific powers
or rights beyond arrest that might be applicable to particular federal offic-
ers. Federal law also provides that attorneys who are not federal prosecu-
tors may be made Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to participate in or pur-
72sue federal cases.
It is frequently the case that state officers make arrests that wind up
being prosecuted in federal court.7 3 By the same token, federal arrests of-
74ten result in Colorado prosecutions. There is nothing inherently wrong
with handing off arrests to a different level of government. In particular
cases, sound reasons might militate in favor of prosecution by one juris-
diction rather than another; the state may have expertise and experience
with respect to certain types of crimes, or preferable treatment or sentenc-
ing options.
Yet, this practice represents a grant of power to law enforcement;
state and local police can "shop" cases to prosecutors willing to take them.
If the local district attorney finds a case or category of cases unacceptable
or to be a low priority, perhaps it can go to a U.S. Attorney to be prosecuted
in federal court (and vice versa). It could even be prosecuted in state court
by a special deputy district attorney who is a member of the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office or another state office. In principle, this means that Colorado
(and the United States) could not remove their police and prosecutors from
action is not authorized by state law. In other words, state law does not determine the reasonableness
of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We recently applied Moore in United States v. Gonzales,
535 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008), which is directly on point here. In that case, we held that police
officers' traffic stop of the defendant, outside of their jurisdiction and in violation of Colorado law,
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.").
71. United States v. Cook, 794 F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that "the two state
police officers were deputized as Special Deputy United States Marshals" and thus were properly
permitted to see otherwise confidential federal grand jury materials).
72. Victoria L. Killion, Comment, No Points for the Assist? A Closer Look at the Role ofSpecial
Assistant United States Attorneys in the Cooperative Model of Federal Prosecutions, 82 TEMP. L.
REv. 789, 792-93 (2009); see also Susan Hoyt, Daniel P. Rubinstein Appointed District Attorney for
21st Judicial District, COLO. BAR ASS'N LEGAL CONNECTION (Oct. 7, 2015), http://cbaclelegalcon-
nection.com/2015/10/daniel-p-rubinstein-appointed-district-attorney-for-21st-judicial-district (no ing
that "[flrom 2005 to 2011, [District Attorney Daniel P. Rubenstein] was cross-designated as a Special
Assistant U.S. Attorney where he targeted cartels and organized crime").
73. See United States v. Novitsky, 58 F. App'x 432,433-34 (10th Cir. 2003) (allowing an arrest
by a state officer for possession of a firearm by person with a felony conviction to be tried in federal
court); Moreland v. United States, 347 F.2d 376, 377 (10th Cir. 1965) (allowing an arrest by a state
officer for robbery ofU.S. property); United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1219 (D.
Colo. 2014) (allowing a state officer to arrest an individual for reentry after deportation), aff'd, 615 F.
App'x 485 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Paetsch, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1210-11 (D. Colo. 2012)
(allowing an arrest by state officers for bank robbery), aff'd, 782 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2015).
74. United States v. Galindo, 543 F. App'x 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2013) ("The evidence at trial
established that Officer Skelton has worked with the DEA Task Force since 2007, has been formally
deputized by the DEA, and carries DEA credentials ... investigations that are managed and controlled
by the DEA nevertheless are frequently charged in state court."); People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 871
(Colo. 1985) (allowing ATF agents arrest of a murder suspect), rev'd, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); People v.
Ridley, 872 P.2d 1377, 1378 (Colo. App. 1994) (discussing a DEA investigation leading to state court
drug prosecution).
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particular fields of prosecution simply by decriminalizing the conduct. Po-
lice and prosecutors might be able pursue such cases while wearing their
other hats, just as, say New York police assisted in the enforcement of
alcohol prohibition after the repeal of state prohibition.75 In addition, po-
lice and prosecutors can avoid Colorado (or United States) procedural and
evidentiary rules by pursuing the case in the other jurisdiction.
State and federal authorities often work together. There are several
ongoing joint state-federal task forces, including the Joint Terrorism Task
Force,n the Southern Colorado Drug Task Force, and a BATFE task
75. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 315 (1927) ("[F]acts of which we take judicial
notice . . . . make it clear that the state troopers believed that they were required by law to aid in
enforcing the National Prohibition Act, and that they made this arrest, search, and seizure, in the per-
formance of that supposed uty, solely for the purpose of aiding in the federal prosecution.").
76. United States v. Mosko, 654 F. Supp. 402, 405-06 (D. Colo. 1987) ("The defendants also
argue that the pen register evidence should be suppressed because the applications and court orders
failed to comply with Colorado case law holding that pen registers are a search within the meaning of
the Colorado Constitution and therefore require a search warrant supported by probable cause. People
v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 139-40 (Colo. 1983). This court has previously held that state law on this
point is irrelevant to a federal investigation and prosecution. United States v. Grabow, 621 F. Supp.
787, 794 (D. Colo. 1985)."), affd sub nom. United States v. Pinelli, 890 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1989);
see also, e.g., Butterwood v. United States, 365 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1966) ("[The McNabb-Mal-
lory Rule] was promulgated in pursuance of the federal court's supervisory power over federal prose-
cutions. It is not a Constitutional prohibition. It applies only to federal officials and an arrest under
federal law. It has no application to an arrest made under state law. Here, appellant was arrested by
state police and incarcerated by the state for suspicion of having violated a state law." (citation omit-
ted)); cf Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 306 (2009) (noting that McNabb-Mallory Rule remains
in effect).
77. United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 977 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[Colorado's Joint Terrorism
Task Force] is a law enforcement task force comprised of the FBI and other federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies that investigate crimes involving international and domestic terrorism.");
see also Tung Yin, Joint Terrorism Task Forces as a Window into the Security vs. Civil Liberties
Debate, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) ("Other counterterrorism investigations involve coop-
erative ventures between state and federal forces, typically through a Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF). In a typical JTTF arrangement, the local police department assigns a number of its officers to
work on the task force with federal agents. Although the local officers remain paid by their local
department, they are considered federal agents for most purposes, including the United States' re-
spondeat superior liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for their tortious conduct. As of 2011,
over one hundred American cities are participating in JTTFs.").
78. See United States v. Jones, 69 F. App'x 401, 402 (10th Cir. 2003) (involving an appeal
involving a case brought by Southern Colorado Drug Task Force). There is also a Rocky Mountain
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING
AREA, http://www.rmhidta.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2017); see also 21 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(2) (2006)
(repealed 2010) ("The purpose of the [HIDTA] Program is to reduce drug trafficking and drug pro-
duction in the United States by [] facilitating cooperation among Federal, State, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities.").
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force;79 others appear to come and go.80 There is also state-federal cooper-
ation on an ad hoc basis.81 These entities, which are neither wholly state
nor wholly federal, also create room for officers to pursue their own poli-
cies with some independence from their employing jurisdiction. Thus, for
example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that state
officers had no obligation to comply with Colorado law requiring the re-
turn of medical marijuana seized pursuant to a Colorado search warrant
because the officers were part of a federal task force and could rely on
federal law.82
CONCLUSION
To be sure, the United States, Colorado, and their officials have
means of carrying out criminal justice policies. If officers or prosecutors
of one jurisdiction abused their borrowed authority, their designations
79. The Pueblo Police website notes that "[flour detectives are assigned to the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration Southern Colorado Drug Task Force, 2 detectives are assigned to the Bureau of
Alcohol Tobacco Firearms Explosives (BATFE) Gun Task Force and I detective [is] assigned to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force." See Pueblo Police: Narcotics/Vice Sec-
tion, CITY OF PUEBLO COLORADO, http://www.pueblo.us/430/Narcotics-Vice-Section (last visited
Apr. 14, 2017).
80. See United States v. Zapata, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (D. Colo. 2003) ("Vail Police
Department continued coordinated efforts with federal agents in an investigation and sting of a sus-
pected cocaine ring in Eagle County, Colorado. The multi-jurisdictional investigators composed a drug
task force."); see also United States v. Grabow, 621 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Colo. 1985) (referring to
"a Denver Police Department detective assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration Task
Force"); People v. O'Hara, 240 P.3d 283, 284 (Colo. App. 2010) ("This case arises from a joint law
enforcement task force operation based in Grand Junction, Colorado. The operation's purpose was to
target major illegal drug dealers in the area."), aff'd, 271 P.3d 503 (Colo. 2012).
81. See People v. Arapu, 283 P.3d 680, 681 (Colo. 2012) ("Federal Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") agents sought to contact Arapu, suspecting he was in the country illegally. In
accordance with their standard protocol, ICE requested assistance from local law enforcement, in this
case, the Aspen Police Department."); see also People v. Montoya, 517 P.2d 401, 401 (Colo. 1973)
("The marijuana was seized after federal agents and local policemen had broken into defendant's home
on September 27, 1972, under an Arrest warrant."); People v. Genrich, 928 P.2d 799, 801 (Colo. App.
1996) ("Defendant's convictions arose out of three different incidents in which pipe bombs exploded
and injured one victim and killed two other victims. After a lengthy and extensive investigation that
included various suspects, law enforcement officers focused on defendant and he was ultimately
charged. The investigating officers included both local police officers and agents of the Federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF).").
82. In so holding, the court concluded the following:
Regarding the first element, Nord initially disputes that the Respondents were acting as
federal agents because, among other things, they confiscated Nord's property pursuant to
a state court issued warrant. However, Respondents were either federal employees
(Cortinovis) or deputized DEA agents (Hoefner, Lovin, Kelliher, Murphy, and Reece) who
worked full time for a DEA-sponsored task force supervised by DEA personnel. Courts
have consistently treated local law enforcement agents deputized as federal agents and act-
ing as part of a federal task force as federal agents. See United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d
1212, 1214 (10th Cir. 1998) (local police detective deputized to participate in federal nar-
cotics investigation is a federal officer within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B));
United States v. Torres, 862 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); Amoakohene v.
Bobko, 792 F. Supp. 605, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (arrestee prohibited from bringing § 1983
suit against DEA task-force members, including deputized local law enforcement officers,
because task-force members were acting as federal agents, not state actors, even though
they arrested him on municipal charges).
People v. Nord, 377 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949 (D. Colo. 2005).
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could be revoked, or the legislature could decide to change the law, for
example, to modify or eliminate the Special Assistant U.S. Attorney pro-
gram. In addition, through institutions like Criminal Justice Coordinating
Councils, jurisdictions attempt to monitor the system as a whole.83 Never-
theless, diffusion of police and prosecutorial authority make the problem
of monitoring and controlling the criminal justice system much more dif-
ficult.
83. See Adams County Crim. Just. Coordinating Council - CJCC, ADAMS COUNTY COLO.,
https://www.adcogov.org/criminal-justice-coordinating-council-cjcc (last visited Apr. 14, 2017)
("The Adams County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC), serves as the designated inde-
pendent advisory body within the jurisdiction to address systemic criminal justice, juvenile justice and
victim services issues informed by evidence-based practices and guided by evidence-based deci-
sion-making."); see also ROBERT C. CUSHMAN, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING A CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COMMITTEE 2-3
(2002), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/017232.pdf.
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